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The literature on “agency discretion” has, with a few notable  
exceptions,1 largely focused on substantive policy discretion,2 not 
procedural discretion.3 In this essay, we seek to refocus debate on 
the latter, which we argue is no less worthy of attention. We do so 
by defining the parameters of what we call Vermont Yankee’s “white 
                                                                                                                   
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. 
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. 
1.  See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 
1919 (2016) (offering a compelling theoretical justification for judicial deference to agency 
decisions about procedure); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Substance and Procedural  
Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens 
in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979) (arguing that formal procedures are not necessary 
to resolve technical questions related to the regulation of carcinogens). 
2. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency Discretion, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 97 (2016) (exploring agency reluctance to exercise discretion under the 
Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act); Jody Freeman & David 
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing agencies'  
strategic use of existing statutory authority to tackle novel problems). See also Ming H. Chen, 
Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 87 (2016) (examining the legitimacy of expansive executive actions under existing  
immigration statutes); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 
(2016) (describing congressional delegations of authority permitting an agency to forbear from 
implementing statutory provisions). 
3. Notable exceptions include Elizabeth Magill's work on agencies' discretion to make 
policy by rulemaking or adjudication, M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking 
Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004), and Adrian Vermeule’s recent essay exhorting  
and defending judicial deference to agency procedural choices. See Vermeule, supra note 1. 
Vermeule provides a detailed review of existing doctrine on agency freedom to determine what 
process is due under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1890–95. Vermeule then defends less- 
intrusive rationality review for these choices as consistent with both Dworkinian principles 
of coherence and Elyian ideas about representation-reinforcement. Id. at 1911, 1923. Funda-
mentally, Vermeule’s essay focuses on the institutional allocation of authority to determine 
the outer boundaries of agency procedural discretion that are established by constitutional 
norms. Id. at 1893–95. In this essay, we seek to expand the analysis of agency procedural 
discretion beyond constitutional bounds to include statutory, executive, and non-legal limits, 
thereby providing a fuller picture of the phenomenon. 
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space”—the scope of agency discretion to experiment with proce-
dures within the boundaries established by law (and thus beyond 
the reach of the courts).4 Our goal is to begin a conversation about 
the dimensions of this procedural negative space, in which agencies 
are free to experiment with new approaches without judicial over-
sight. We also explore some of the ways in which energy and  
environmental agencies are innovating within these boundaries. 
Process matters. In discussing the Vermont Yankee decision, 
then-Professor Antonin Scalia wrote of “the indissoluble link be-
tween procedure and power.”5 Indeed, the power to design process 
is in many cases the power to dictate, or at least to affect, substan-
tive outcomes. Procedural innovation can therefore be an important 
tool for agencies seeking to fulfill their statutory mandates. 
Part II briefly expands on the scope of the project. Part III then 
shifts from abstraction to specifics, examining ways in which the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have exploited their considerable 
freedom to experiment with process. Much has been made of the 
ways in which these agencies are using aging statutory mandates to 
address modern problems.6 We note the same trend but propose that 
focusing on substantive policies tells only part of the story. Energy 
and environmental agencies are also moving beyond procedural 
minima to take advantage of, for example, new technologies and  
developments in organizational theory. These procedural innova-
tions are enabling the agencies to achieve goals more efficiently and 
effectively and to emphasize aspects of their mandates that they, in 
their expert judgment, find to be most significant. 
Parts IV and V—the heart of the essay—enumerate six catego-
ries of limitation on procedural discretion: constitutional, statutory, 
judicial, executive, administrative (as where an agency limits its 
                                                                                                                   
4. Vermont Yankee held that courts may generally not impose procedural require-
ments on agencies beyond those contained in the APA or their authorizing statutes. Vt.  
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (noting 
“the very basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own 
rules of procedure”). That ruling was recently reaffirmed in the Mortgage Bankers case, in 
which the Supreme Court reversed a line of D.C. Circuit cases requiring agencies to submit 
revised interpretations of their own rules to notice and comment. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015). In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Court noted that  
the D.C. Circuit doctrine “improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the APA’s 
maximum procedural requirements.” Id. at 1201; see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that “agencies are, of course, free to 
adopt additional procedures as they see fit”). 
5. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, FERC's Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783 (2016) (noting both the history of and new opportunities for  
assertion of FERC's authority under existing statutes); Freeman & Spence, supra note 2; 
Daniel J. Fiorino, Streams of Environmental Innovation: Four Decades of EPA Policy Reform, 
44 ENVTL. L. 723 (2014) (describing policy innovations at EPA across four decades). 
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own discretion), and non-legal. In Part IV, we touch briefly on  
constitutional considerations, which have been thoroughly explored 
by Vermeule and others.7 We then consider how the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and various other statutes may limit an  
agency's discretion to adopt innovative procedures. Next, we explore 
separate requirements imposed by the courts, notwithstanding  
Vermont Yankee's admonition that courts may not require agencies 
to adopt procedures beyond those enumerated in the APA. Finally, 
we turn to procedural constraints originating with the President.  
In Part V, we argue that the absence of significant legal limitations 
does not necessarily invite arbitrary procedural decisionmaking.  
In this Part, we address two types of limitation on procedural dis-
cretion that are less well studied: agencies’ self-imposed constraints 
and non-legal constraints. We conclude by inviting additional re-
search into the scope and uses of agency procedural discretion. 
 
II. THE PROCESS/SUBSTANCE DICHOTOMY 
 
To make any argument about the scope of agency procedural  
discretion it is first necessary to define our terms. When we propose 
a category of “procedural” discretion, we do not mean to argue  
that the line between substance and process is always a clear one. 
However, the categories are at least conceptually distinct and we 
find that there are enough “easy cases” to preserve the utility of the 
distinction. 
Here, we start with the definition of “procedural rules” proposed 
by Larry Solum, who analogizes them to H.L.A. Hart's “secondary 
rules”: those that define institutional powers to make laws and rules 
(as opposed to primary rules, which require people to do or abstain 
from doing certain things).8 This definition distinguishes between 
the so-called “rules of the legal game”—the rules that apply to actors 
inside legal institutions—and the rules of conduct that apply to 
members of the general public.9 We note that this definition is broad 
enough to include agency rules of practice that shape the conduct  
of members of the regulated community and the public, not in  
their substantive activities, but in their interactions with the agency 
itself. 
We find support for this definition in the APA’s distinction  
between so-called legislative rules and “rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice.”10 In distinguishing between the two, 
                                                                                                                   
7. See supra note 1. 
8. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 208–09 (2004). 
9. Id. 
10. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
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the D.C. Circuit employs a “functional analysis” rather than ob-
sessing about labels.11 The main purpose of the distinction is to  
ensure “that agencies retain latitude in organizing their internal  
operations.”12 Thus, “the exemption's critical feature is that it covers 
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests 
of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties 
present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.”13 
But let us move from the abstract to the concrete. We subdivide 
agency “procedures” into two categories of rules. First, such proce-
dures include rules that govern the agency's internal operations,  
including rules governing commission voting, for example, or struc-
turing collaboration with other agencies. We also conclude that  
such internal rules include decisions about how to allocate scarce 
resources, including but not limited to enforcement prioritization.14 
Second, they include external rules to the extent that those rules 
govern interactions between the public and the agency. Examples 
here are rules for participation in rulemaking, for submitting li-
cense applications, and the like.15 
Procedural choices are inextricably intertwined with substan-
tive ends. Procedures that increase agency transparency or facili-
tate public involvement in agency decisionmaking may serve demo-
cratic and participatory goals. Procedures that induce additional de-
liberation or reliance on expert opinion by agency decisionmakers 
may serve the goal of nonarbitrary government decisionmaking. 
And procedures that speed up decisionmaking processes may serve 
efficiency goals. In fact, if you push on any procedural rule, you will 
                                                                                                                   
11. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
12. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). 
13. Id. Other circuit courts have similar rules. See, e.g., Brown Express, Inc. v. United 
States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979) (identifying legislative rules as those that have  
“a substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the members or the 
products of that industry”). This definition recalls the Erie test for distinguishing between 
process and substance, most recently articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in Shady 
Grove. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (stating 
“[w]hat matters is what the rule itself regulates, and if it governs only the manner and the 
means by which the litigants' rights are enforced, it is [procedural], but if it alters the rules 
of decision by which the court will adjudicate those rights,’ it is [substantive]”). 
14. Courts analyzing APA section 553's exception for procedural rules have reached a 
similar conclusion. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(holding that a series of agency directives and manuals defining enforcement strategy of  
review boards was covered by the exception). 
15. When political scientists talk about the congressional manipulation of agency  
process as a mechanism of control, they sometimes include structural features in that defini-
tion. See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices 
About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62 (1995) (including in the defi-
nition of procedure such design features as “which agency makes the decision, how the agency 
is organized, what qualifications are required for key personnel, and how the agency relates 
to the rest of the bureaucracy”). However, because our perspective is internal to the agency, 
and because agencies frequently have little to no control over such structural attributes, we 
do not include them in the discussion here. 
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find a substantive policy underlying it.16 This suggests not that the 
line between procedure and substance is not worth drawing, but 
that we should be attentive to the substantive consequences of  
procedural rules. Indeed, that is why procedural discretion matters: 
process choices not only reflect but further substantive values.17 
 
III. PROCEDURAL INNOVATION AT EPA AND FERC 
 
Because of the values it serves and because of its substantive 
effects, procedural innovation should not be overlooked. And agen-
cies do experiment with procedure, as a series of examples from two 
key environmental and energy agencies should make plain. We first 
explore three innovations at the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which has tended to exercise its procedural discretion to  
increase understanding about the agency's activities as well as to 
expand the impact of its work. Meanwhile, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission (FERC) has adopted unconventional strategies 
for improving the quality of its regulatory product. 
EPA has been highly innovative when it comes to the agency's 
public outreach and educational efforts. For example, EPA held  
“listening sessions” across the country during the roll-out of its  
proposed Clean Power Plan rule, which imposes greenhouse gas 
emissions limits on existing power plants.18 Stakeholders selected 
for their “expertise in the Clean Air Act standard-setting process” 
were invited to participate in roundtable discussions to provide feed-
back on the proposed rule. Transcripts and recordings of the meet-
ings were made available to the public.19 Such sessions are not  
legally required, but so long as they do not run afoul of ex parte  
requirements, they do not violate existing law.20 This additional  
discussion with stakeholders, above and beyond what is required by 
the notice-and-comment process in the APA and by other statutes, 
can improve the substance of final rules as well as generate public 
buy-in for agency actions. 
                                                                                                                   
16. Relatedly, as the Court noted in Shady Grove, most procedural rules do affect  
federal litigants' substantive rights. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. 
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85,  
85 (1982) (arguing that procedures that protect against deprivation of a substantive right 
effectively describe the strength of that right). 
18. Clean Power Plan: Past Listening Sessions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/past-listening-sessions (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). The 
Clean Power Plan, of course, is now tied up in the courts and its fate remains uncertain. Order 
Granting Application for a Stay at 1, Chamber of Commerce v. EPA (2016) (No. 15A787), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr3_hf5m.pdf. 
19. Clean Power Plan: Past Listening Sessions, supra note 18. 
20. EPA has its own internal rules governing ex parte contacts. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
“EX PARTE” CONTACTS IN EPA RULEMAKING (1985) (requiring that all comments and any  
information likely to affect the final decision be placed in the public record). 
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EPA has also been innovative when it comes to publicizing  
its rules and programs via the Internet and social media.21 Such  
efforts are “procedural” in that they do not alter the substance of  
EPA's programs, merely the form of their dissemination. And EPA's  
statutes do not specifically require the agency to engage in such  
outreach efforts.22 Annual appropriations acts tend to prohibit  
EPA from using appropriated funds for propaganda or lobbying pur-
poses, and the agency has sometimes run afoul of these prohibitions 
in expanding its social media presence.23 However, other aspects  
of EPA's campaigns have survived legal scrutiny, including its  
expenditure of nearly $65,000 on video and graphics to promote its 
“Waters of the United States” rule that refined EPA jurisdiction 
over navigable waters.24 By reaching out to the public on modern 
technology platforms, EPA is encouraging increasing understanding 
of its programs as well as promoting civic engagement. 
EPA has also exercised what might be called, in a nod to Daphna 
Renan, intra-agency power “pooling”25: the concentration of various 
substantive agency authorities to achieve more powerful results.  
In its “Making a Visible Difference in Communities” program, EPA 
targets “environmentally overburdened, underserved, and economi-
cally distressed areas where the needs [for support] are greatest.”26 
The agency then draws on its diverse expertise and authority in,  
for example, remediation of polluted sites, redevelopment of brown-
fields, stormwater and waste management, and collection and dis-
semination of environmental quality data, to mitigate environmen-
tal harms in those areas.27 The focusing of such efforts within a  
single community to achieve broader health and sustainability 
 goals demonstrates the power of procedural decisions, in this case 
resource allocation, to support substantive aims.  
                                                                                                                   
21. Elizabeth Porter and Kathryn Watts have written about one aspect of these  
efforts: the use of visual media to enhance communication. Elizabeth G. Porter & Kathryn A. 
Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183 (2016). See also Stephen M. Johnson,  
#BetterRules: the Appropriate Use of Social Media in Rulemaking, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2017) (discussing the limits legal limits on EPA's use of social media). 
22. However, statutory support for these activities may be found in both the National 
Environmental Education Act of 1990 and in the E-Government Act of 2002. National  
Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501–5510 (1990); E-Government Act of 2002,  
44 U.S.C. §§ 101, 3501, 3601, 41 U.S.C. § 266a. 
23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326944, LETTER TO SENATOR JAMES INHOFE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY—APPLICATION OF PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA AND 
ANTI-LOBBYING PROVISIONS (2015). 
24. Id. at 2. 
25. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015) (arguing that 
presidents can exploit joint agency activities to expand their own powers). 
26. Smart Growth: Making a Visible Difference in Communities, ENVTL. PROT.  
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/making-visible-difference-communities (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2017). 
27. Id. 
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EPA is not alone in its procedural innovation. FERC, which  
unlike EPA operates as an independent commission, is the nation's 
regulator of wholesale electric energy and natural gas, among other 
responsibilities. The agency has been in the news over the last  
several decades for its substantive policy innovations. Perhaps most 
significantly, it has used existing statutory authority to restructure 
both wholesale natural gas and electricity sales to more closely  
resemble a free market.28 But FERC's procedures, while perhaps 
less likely to capture the public imagination, are also worthy of  
regard. This section will describe three innovative procedures at 
FERC that are deserving of greater attention. The first two are pro-
cedures for better ventilation of ideas and strategy early on in 
agency processes. The last concerns error-correction within the 
agency prior to legal challenge in court. 
First are technical conferences. These are public meetings  
during which invited panelists make presentations to the commis-
sion on topics of the commission's choosing. Such conferences are 
not required as part of the rulemaking process, either by the APA 
or under the various energy statutes that FERC implements. The 
conferences may relate to an ongoing rulemaking or simply to a  
matter about which the commission desires to know more.29 The 
agency will typically issue notice of the technical conference as part 
of the relevant docket along with a description of the topics to be 
addressed and questions to frame the discussion. The conferences 
are open to the public and are frequently made available via webcast 
and archived for several months.30 
Technical conferences are a valuable mechanism for both gath-
ering information from stakeholders and for giving those stakehold-
ers insight into policies the agency is considering prior to more  
formal agency action. For example, technical conferences can pro-
vide a forum for discussing priorities in areas of overlapping  
jurisdiction.31 In terms of the input participants are afforded, these 
                                                                                                                   
28. See Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self- 
Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission’s Regulations, 59 FERC ¶ 
61,030 (1993). Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory 
Transmission Service by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996). 
29. See, e.g. FERC, Technical Conference to Discuss Competitive Transmission Devel-
opment Rates (Docket No. AD16-18000) (June 27–28, 2016); Technical Conference to Discuss 
Implementation Issues Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Docket  
No. AD16-16-000) (June 29, 2016). 
30. Archived webcasts are available at FERC Live Video & Audio Webcasts and  
Archives, FERC, http://ferc.capitolconnection.org/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2017). 
31. See Julia E. Sullivan, The Intersection of Federally Regulated Power Markets  
and State Energy and Environmental Goals, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 474, 475 (2015) 
(citing Notice of Joint Technical Conference, Joint Technical Conference on N.Y. Mkts. &  
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conferences fall midway between negotiated rulemaking, which  
involves participants much more actively in rule formation,32 and 
EPA's webinar series, which educates participants about prelimi-
nary or final rules after those rules are published.  
Second, FERC offers pre-filing meetings during which potential 
parties may review their draft filings with FERC staff prior to  
submitting them formally to the agency. Parties who may wish  
to avail themselves of this option include companies submitting  
rate filings as well as consumers wishing to file a complaint against 
a utility. Nothing in the agency's governing statutes or rules  
requires them to offer this service. However, the meetings are useful 
on both sides. Companies or consumers are able to incorporate 
changes suggested by the agency that can improve the quality of 
their filings. And the agency itself can get a better feel for the pre-
cise nature of the results sought than they could glean from paper 
filings alone. Thus, they are better able to process the filings once 
submitted.33 
Finally, FERC frequently adds another stage to the standard 
rulemaking process: rehearings that often result in issuances of  
revised rules. Both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act 
require potential litigants to seek rehearing at the agency before 
challenging a FERC action in court. But neither statute requires the 
agency to grant these requests. Over the years, however, FERC has 
been inclined to grant such petitions so long as they raise plausible 
questions about an aspect of a rule's validity or desirability. Doing 
so has become part of the agency culture, and it is common for  
complex or controversial rulemakings to be issued in successive  
iterations with titles such as “Rule 719-A,” “Rule 719-B,” and so on. 
Rehearing can be helpful to industry and other parties if it  
creates greater certainty as to the scope and meaning of the under-
lying rule. However, the advantages of rehearing do not accrue 
solely to stakeholders. For the agency, rehearing provides an oppor-
tunity to clarify aspects of the underlying rule or to correct mistakes. 
These clarifications might either avoid litigation or strengthen the 
agency record so that the rule is more likely to survive a challenge 
                                                                                                                   
Infrastructure, No. AD14-18-000 (F.E.R.C. Sept. 17, 2014) https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalen-
dar/EventDetails.aspx?ID=7531&CalType=& CalendarID=116&Date=11/05/2014&View= 
Listview, archived at http://perma.cc/VS26-TMGQ). 
32. For an overview of negotiated rulemaking, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consen-
sus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (find-
ing that negotiated rulemaking fails to improve agency timeliness or reduce litigation). 
33. Information about this process comes from conversations with senior FERC staff. 
FERC has interpreted these meetings as fully consistent with the agency's Ex Parte Rule, 
Order 607, 88 FERC ¶ 61,225 (1999), which prohibits only off-the-record communications with 
decisional employees after the commencement of any contested, “on the record,” trial-type 
proceedings. See MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co,, et al., 118 FERC ¶ 61,003, 61,007–10 
(2007). 
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in court. While rehearing is itself costly in terms of time and  
resources, it may avoid the even greater costs associated with  
litigation. 
None of the innovations discussed in this section are required  
by law, but neither are they prohibited by it. They were enacted in 
the discretionary space beyond the law's procedural minima. While 
no individual process may be radical, collectively these adjustments 
and innovations can facilitate achievement of an agency's substan-
tive goals over time. But how much room do agencies actually have 
to innovate in this space? It is to that question that the next Part 
turns. 
 
IV. THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF AGENCY  
PROCEDURAL DISCRETION 
 
To understand the realm of agency procedural discretion, we 
must begin by identifying its outer boundaries. These boundaries 
are established, first and foremost, by the law, which imposes vari-
ous limitations on the ability of an administrative agency to design 
its own procedures. There are four key sources of legal limitations 
on agency procedural discretion: the Constitution, statutes, judicial 
precedent, and executive edicts. Within these boundaries, adminis-
trative agencies are typically afforded substantial latitude to design 
their own procedures, subject to minimal judicial intervention. 
The Constitution is the foundational legal restriction on govern-
ment action generally, and its minimum requirements apply in  
the administrative context. Key for our purposes here is the well-
established principle that agencies must observe the requirements 
of constitutional due process in designing administrative proce-
dures.34 These constitutional requirements are modest, but agencies 
must consider them in the procedural design process. Agencies  
may even have an independent duty to “interpret and implement 
the U.S. Constitution,” a phenomenon that has been referred to  
as “administrative constitutionalism.”35 An agency designing its 
                                                                                                                   
34. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.  
254 (1970). 
35. Agencies are thus required to “interpret and implement the U.S. Constitution,”  
a phenomenon that has been referred to as “administrative constitutionalism.” See Gillian E. 
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (2013); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 26–27 (2010); Elizabeth Fisher, Food Safety Crises as Crises in Administrative  
Constitutionalism, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 55 (2010); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 
801 (2010); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 519, 529 (2015) (“Agencies’ constitutional value judgments, made in the process  
of interpreting statutes, are what I define as ‘administrative constitutionalism.’”). 
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procedures must therefore first consider the minimum require-
ments imposed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.36 
The Due Process Clause applies only if an agency’s action threatens 
to deprive an individual of an interest in life, liberty, or property.37 
In such circumstances, the minimum procedures due to the individ-
ual, as well as the timing of those procedures (e.g., pre- or post- 
deprivation), are determined based on a flexible and context- 
specific evaluation of the agency action in question.38 Relatively  
few administrative disputes are resolved on due process grounds, 
however, and thus other sources of legal limitation on agency  
procedural design play a more significant role in shaping agency 
procedural design and experimentation.39 
Moving beyond the Constitution, a key source of statutory  
restriction on agency procedural discretion is the APA. There are 
two possible interpretations of how the APA affects agency proce-
dural discretion. First, the APA may be understood as a skeletal 
framework that establishes only minimum procedural requirements 
against a background norm of agency procedural discretion.40 So  
interpreted, the APA establishes only a “floor” for administrative 
procedures. Agencies are empowered to impose more restrictive,  
detailed, or additional procedures beyond those contained in the 
APA, provided that the statutory minimum is observed.41 Second, 
the APA might instead be understood as a statute designed to  
produce procedural uniformity across agencies.42 Achieving uni-
formity would require an interpretation of the APA as more restric-
                                                                                                                   
36. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, § 4. The Due Process Clause is central to our analysis 
because we are focused on administrative procedure. But administrative constitutionalism 
occurs under many other constitutional provisions as well. E.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORK-
PLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014) (examining how the 
National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications Commission interpreted 
and implemented the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (examining the FCC’s scheme for regulating speech, 
which required the agency to consider limitations imposed by the First Amendment). 
37. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977). 
38. See generally RICHARD J. PERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3 (6th ed. 2014). 
39. Id. at 206. 
40. E.g., Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 349 (1st  
Cir. 2004) (“The APA lays out only the most skeletal framework for conducting agency  
adjudications, leaving broad discretion to the affected agencies in formulating detailed proce-
dural rules.”). 
41.  See, e.g., Energy Bar Association, Report of the Committee on Ethics, 12 ENERGY 
L.J. 421, 426 (1991) (explaining that FERC’s rules limiting certain types of ex parte commu-
nications “are more restrictive than under the APA, but this is permissible because the APA 
establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for prohibited ex parte communications”). 
42. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (“The APA was meant to bring 
uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity.”). 
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tive, imposing not only a “floor” but also a “ceiling” for administra-
tive procedures.43 Under this interpretation, agencies must not  
only meet the APA’s minimum requirements, but their discretion to 
deviate from the procedures established by the statute would be  
restricted. It is also possible, of course, that the APA should not be 
interpreted monolithically, and that some provisions of the APA 
may be interpreted to establish a floor, while others may be inter-
preted to establish both a floor and a ceiling.44 
In recent decades, however, courts and scholars have increas-
ingly understood the APA according to the first approach: as a  
skeletal framework that leaves substantial latitude for agency  
procedural innovation.45 There is some evidence that, at least with 
respect to certain discrete subjects, this consensus marks a shift 
away from a contrary view that dominated in the decades immedi-
ately following the APA’s enactment.46 For example, such a shift has 
                                                                                                                   
43. On this point, institutional context matters. For example, Vermont Yankee has been 
described as holding that the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions establish both a floor and 
a ceiling. See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index 
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 126 (2005). But what is typically meant by this is that 
the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions establish a ceiling from a judicial perspective, such 
that it is inappropriate for the courts to impose upon agencies procedural requirements  
beyond those found in the statute. Laura Anzie Nelson, Delineating Deference to Agency  
Science: Doctrine or Political Ideology?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1057, 1070 n.90 (2010). From the ad-
ministrative perspective, the APA’s informal rulemaking provision establishes only a floor, 
such that agencies may voluntarily choose to observe additional procedures. See, e.g., Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312 (1970) (“In Vermont Yankee . . . we held that courts 
could only in ‘extraordinary circumstances’ impose procedural requirements on an agency  
beyond those specified in the APA. It is within an agency’s discretion to afford parties more 
procedure, but it is not the province of the courts to do so.”); Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recom-
mendation 76-3, Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in  
Informal Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,654 (July 19, 1976) (encouraging agencies to voluntar-
ily observe notice and comment procedures beyond those contained in the APA). 
44. Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1300 (2012) (“[A] fundamental compromise underlying the APA was that Congress 
imposed greater procedural rigor and judicial scrutiny only on more formal agency proceed-
ings, leaving less formal proceedings, such as notice and comment rulemakings, subject 
to minimal constraints.”). It is also worth noting that a general understanding of the APA’s 
purpose and operation might emerge only piece-by-piece, as individual provisions addressing 
distinct subjects are examined by courts and commentators. See infra notes 9 and 10 and 
accompanying text. 
45. See, e.g., Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir. 
1983) (“[A]dministrative agencies retain substantial discretion in formulating, interpreting, 
and applying their own procedural rules.” (citing Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 
397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970)); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71  
U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1439 (2004) (“The skeletal provisions of the APA that governed informal 
rulemaking required no elaborate process.”); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Con-
sent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 264 
(1987); James V. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 
72 VA. L. REV. 399, 445 (1986) (“The APA’s judicial review formula has served admirably for 
forty years, but it provides no more than a skeletal framework for control of agency action.”). 
46. But see Jennifer Nou, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 617 (2008) (“Facilitating implementation, the 
drafters of the APA were clear that its minimal procedural requirements were not a ceiling 
but a floor.”). There is also some evidence that Congress intended the APA to establish only 
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occurred in connection with the APA’s provision authorizing federal 
agencies to issue declaratory orders “to terminate a controversy  
or remove uncertainty.”47 Due to this provision’s placement in the 
section of the APA governing formal adjudication, courts and  
commentators for many decades took the view that declaratory  
orders were available only in formal adjudication.48 Over the last 
several decades, however, the courts have quietly abandoned this 
approach, allowing agencies to issue declaratory orders (1) without 
first conducting a “hearing on the record” and (2) to address matters 
not subject by statute to formal adjudication under the APA.49  
This change in how the declaratory orders provision is understood 
has not occurred wholly in isolation, but rather seems to reflect a 
broader shift in how the APA is understood and applied.50 
Beyond the APA are other statutes, both trans-substantive  
and subject-specific, that may also confine agency procedural discre-
tion.51 Trans-substantive statutes such as the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act, for example, limit an agency's ability to 
shield its deliberations and its written materials from public view.52 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all federal 
agencies to assess the effects of actions that may have a significant 
impact on the human environment.53 And the Endangered Species 
Act requires federal agencies to consult with either the Fish and 
Wildlife Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration before taking actions that could jeopardize the continued 
                                                                                                                   
a minimum, but that it expected that courts and not agencies would be the relevant institu-
tional actors establishing requirements above the statutory minimum. See Kenneth Culp  
Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 
12 (1980) (explaining that the Senate “must have meant that courts could add to the [APA’s 
minimum] requirements, for a statement that an agency imposes ‘requirements’ on itself is 
unnatural.”). 
47. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012). 
48. See TOM C. CLARK, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S  
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 59 (Reprint ed. 1973); Emily S. Bremer, 
The Agency Declaratory Order, OHIO ST. L.J. 19–24 (forthcoming 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955214.  
49. See Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609, 624–25 (1973); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t 
of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796–97 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recom-
mendation 2015-3, Declaratory Orders, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015) (urging agencies 
to use declaratory orders more frequently and creatively and suggesting best practices and 
procedures in declaratory proceedings). 
50. See supra note 46. 
51. A commonly cited example is hybrid rulemaking requirements, which Congress has 
imposed upon individual agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission. See Magnuson-
Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 STAT. 
2183 (Jan. 4, 1975). 
52.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Government in the Sunshine 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012).  
53. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
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existence of any endangered or threatened species.54 Agency-specific 
statutes may also impose restrictions. The Federal Power Act, for 
example, contains a series of specific requirements governing rate 
challenges and hearings.55 And the Clean Air Act requires that  
specific procedures be followed in the summoning of witnesses to 
testify in agency proceedings.56 
These statutory requirements are often understood to operate in 
a manner similar to the APA, in the sense that they are viewed as 
establishing procedural floors, not ceilings (except in specific cases 
where Congress has clearly indicated the converse).57 The fact that 
NEPA established a floor rather than a ceiling for procedures to 
evaluate environmental impacts, for example, may be seen in  
its compatibility with state environmental assessment statutes 
(sometimes called mini-NEPAs), some of which go beyond NEPA's 
own requirements.58 Like the APA, then, these statutes typically 
leave agencies free to experiment with procedures that elaborate 
upon the statutory minima. Furthermore, that Congress has repeat-
edly enacted these statutes imposing upon individual agencies 
unique requirements not found in the APA suggests some ac-
ceptance or expectation that there will be at least some variation  
in agency procedures, even for similar activities.59 
A third source of legal restrictions on agency procedural discre-
tion is judicial precedent. Courts have a significant role in interpret-
ing the APA and other procedural statutes, and two variants of legal 
restriction on agency procedural discretion may arise from the  
judiciary’s fulfillment of that role. First, judicial precedent may 
simply interpret and apply statutory requirements in a manner that 
displaces agency interpretation. Second, and more controversial,  
is what is termed “administrative common law,” which arises when 
courts create procedural requirements that are not found in appli-
cable statutes.60 Administrative common law is controversial in part 
                                                                                                                   
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012). Agencies must also cooperate to the maximum extent  
practicable with states before acquiring land or water to preserve endangered or threatened 
species. Id. § 1535. 
55. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012) (requiring commission to fix by order the time 
and place of a rate hearing and specify the issues to be adjudicated). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012). 
57. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Forward: Consumer Protection in the Financial Market-
place, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 309 (2015) (“We believe that the seemingly formulaic 
processes laid out in the APA and the [Dodd-Frank Act] merely create a floor on collaboration 
and public input, not a ceiling.”). 
58.  See Council on Envtl. Quality, State NEPA Contacts, DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://en-
ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/States_NEPA_Like_22June2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 
2017) (listing contacts for states with NEPA-like planning requirements at). 
59. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 499, 572 (2011). 
60. See Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
1215, 1244–48 (2014); Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative 
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because it appears to be in tension with the principle established by 
the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee (and recently reaffirmed in 
Mortgage Bankers Association) that courts should not impose upon 
agencies procedures beyond those required by statute.61 In Vermont 
Yankee, as discussed above, the Court found “little doubt that Con-
gress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the 
courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices 
should be employed.”62 
Then-Professor Scalia's critique of the opinion notwithstand-
ing,63 Vermont Yankee's central holding has stood the test of time. 
Yet, some administrative common law is consistent with Vermont 
Yankee. This is because the Court acknowledged that the general 
principle does not “necessarily [mean] that there are no circum-
stances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency  
action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those  
required by the statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are 
extremely rare.”64 Much administrative common law nonetheless 
operates beyond this narrow exception. Indeed, it is widely recog-
nized that, despite Vermont Yankee, the courts have imposed a  
variety of additional requirements on informal rulemaking.65 This 
is often referred to as a judicial gloss on the APA,66 and it has been 
lamented as a significant contributing factor to the “ossification” of 
that process.67 
Fourth and finally, executive edicts may also impose legal  
limitations on agency procedural discretion. There are a number of 
executive orders that impose procedural requirements on agency  
                                                                                                                   
Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2011); see also Metzger, supra note 44, at 1295 (“By administrative 
common law, I am referring to administrative law doctrines and requirements that are largely 
judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual 
agencies.”). 
61. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Vt. Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
62. 435 U.S. at 546. 
63. Scalia, supra note 5 (criticizing the decision's apparent reverence for the APA as the 
“Magna Carta” of administrative procedure and offering historical, doctrinal, and institu-
tional reasons for permitting courts to require additional agency process). 
64. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
65. The necessity of judicial imposition of these requirements was evident to some at 
the time of the Supreme Court’s decision. See Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the 
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1816 (1978). 
66. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capri-
cious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 2 n.1, (2009) (referring to the D.C. Circuit's “hard look” review 
as a judicial gloss on the meaning of the APA's arbitrary and capricious test); M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (noting the im-
portance of the judicial gloss on the APA for courts reviewing agency action); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1997) 
(claiming that “the judicial gloss on the APA has taken on a large significance over time”). 
67. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 59, 65–66 (1995). 
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action, often in the context of rulemaking.68 For example, Executive 
Order 13,132 requires agencies to consider the potential effects on 
federalism when they are drafting regulations.69 More famously,  
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to conduct benefit-cost 
analysis for economically significant regulations.70 Other controls on 
agency procedures are exerted through the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), which is located within the Executive Office  
of the President.71 One such control is the review of significant  
proposed and final rules conducted by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. This review may substantially influence individ-
ual agencies’ rulemaking processes.72 Finally, the president’s budget 
process may also limit agency procedural discretion.73 
Over the decades, there has been a shift towards broader recog-
nition of the agencies’ authority to establish their own procedures.74 
As an initial matter, agencies have a significant role in interpreting 
the laws that establish the boundaries of their procedural discre-
tion. For example, the practical reality is that administrative agen-
cies are usually the first and often the last arbiters of what process 
is due under the Constitution. This is because such administrative 
constitutionalism is frequently not subject to judicial review and, 
when the courts do review it, they are often deferential to the agent’s 
judgment.75 Courts have similarly adopted a deferential stance to-
wards agency interpretations of statutes they are authorized to ad-
minister.76 This includes recognition that Chevron deference applies 
to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory “jurisdiction.”77 
 
                                                                                                                   
68. See generally Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory  
Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,800, 47,801–02 (Aug. 10, 2012) (discussing various 
regulatory analysis requirements imposed by statute and executive order). 
69. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999); see Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012); Admin. Conf. of the U.S., 
Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law, 76 
Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011). 
70. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
71. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2247 
(2001). 
72. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf. 
73. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 
125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016). 
74. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1911–19 (analyzing three streams of precedent 
in which courts have been deferential to agencies’ procedural judgments). 
75. See id. at 1891–92; see also Freeman & Spence, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
76. For example, unless a statute uses the magical words “hearing on the record,”  
a court is likely to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own statute as not 
requiring formal adjudication under the APA. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. 
Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006). 
77. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). 
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V. NON-LEGAL LIMITS ON AGENCY PROCEDURAL DISCRETION 
 
The absence of any legal restriction on agency action might  
be interpreted, wrongly, to indicate that an agency has limitless or 
unfettered authority to act.78 In practice, there are a variety of non-
legal restrictions on agency procedural discretion, including agency 
self-regulation, structural constraints, reputational constraints, 
and professional constraints.79 In the absence of significant legal  
restrictions on agency procedural innovation, these “soft” con-
straints play a larger role in defining Vermont Yankee's white space. 
The first category of constraints includes those that are self-im-
posed or self-regulatory. Elizabeth Magill defines a self-regulatory 
activity as an agency action “to limit its own discretion when no 
source of authority (such as a statute) requires the agency to act.”80 
Agencies may themselves adopt rules ex ante that constrain their 
ability to innovate procedurally.81 For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration adopted guidelines for the issuance of guidance  
documents—in essence, guidance for guidance—that were later  
codified pursuant to the Food and Drug Administration Moderniza-
tion Act of 1997.82 And FERC has limited its ability to exercise  
enforcement discretion by issuing a policy statement on civil penalty 
guidelines.83 In some cases, even less formal agency conventions 
might limit the agency's ability to shift its practices without warn-
ing.84 
Beyond self-imposed rules, three additional categories of con-
straint limit agency freedom to innovate procedurally: collaborative 
constraints, reputational constraints, and professional constraints. 
                                                                                                                   
78. See, e.g., Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902) (“The establishment of a clearly 
defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word 
for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action.”).  
79.  For an argument that the President, too, is bound by such non-legal constraints, 
see ADRIAN VERMEULE & ERIC POSNER, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010) (citing the reelection 
constraint, in particular, as cabining executive authority). 
80. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 861 
(2009) (explaining why agencies might engage in self-limiting behavior). While Magill identi-
fies “extra” procedures as forms of self-regulation, it is crucial to understand that procedure 
can be used to expand agency power as well as to limit it. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 25. 
81. Emily Hammond and David Markell have written of the promise of “inside-out”  
legitimacy, or the ability of administrative process to substitute for judicial review in legiti-
mating administrative action. Emily Hammond & David Markell, Administrative Proxies  
for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 
327–28 (2013). 
82. Food & Drug Admin., Administrative Practice and Procedures Good Guidance  
Practices 65 Fed. Reg. 56,468 (Sept. 19, 2000). 
83. FERC, Revised Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216  
(Sept. 17, 2010). 
84. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
548 (1978) (stating that past agency practice permited the court to review and overturn the 
rulemaking proceeding). 
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First are collaborative constraints. When agencies operate in shared 
regulatory space, they may be subject to structural constraints on 
their procedural discretion. Shared regulatory space is created when 
Congress delegates to more than one agency power to undertake the 
same or similar functions or otherwise to operate within a single, 
larger area of regulatory responsibility.85 Joint agency authority 
may limit agency discretion, including the discretion to innovate 
procedurally. This is partly due to the necessity for agencies to coor-
dinate their activities in shared regulatory space, such as through 
joint rulemaking, interagency agreements, and agency consultation 
agreements.86 When the task at hand is to determine the best or 
most prudent action (and not just to identify the outer limits of  
permissible action), disagreement among agencies that share  
authority may impose a real limitation.87 
In the energy and environmental space, consider EPA's imple-
mentation of its Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (limiting the 
emission of toxic air pollutants from existing power plants) to allow 
certain power plants extra time to comply.88 Although nothing in the 
Clean Air Act required it to do so, EPA adopted a strategy, laid down 
in a policy memorandum,89 of consulting with FERC reliability  
experts before deciding whether to grant an extension request. 
While it did not acknowledge expressly that failure to consult  
                                                                                                                   
85. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
86. See generally Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2012-5, Improving  
Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg., 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012) (recom-
mending procedures and best practices for using these and other approaches to improving 
agency coordination in shared regulatory space). 
87. One example arises in connection with the selection, appointment, and supervision 
of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Here, one agency (such as the Social Security Admin-
istration) has statutory authority to administer an adjudicatory program, while another 
agency (the Office of Personal Management (OPM)) has statutory authority to regulate the 
selection, appointment, and supervision of the ALJs who will preside over the hearings within 
that adjudicatory program. This division of authority is intended to preserve the independ-
ence of ALJs by introducing into administrative adjudication some separation of functions. 
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1302(a), 1305, 3105, 3304, 3323(b), 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5372, and 7521 
(2012); see generally VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW (2010); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A  
Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111 (1981). OPM’s fulfillment of  
its statutory responsibility constrains the adjudicatory agency’s discretion to appoint and con-
trol its ALJs. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN 
THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 27–32 (March 31, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC  
REPORT], https://www.acus.gov/report/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-evaluat-
ing-status-and-placement-adjudicators-federal. 
88. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 
49 C.F.R. § 63 (2017). See Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
89. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement  
Response Policy For Use of Clean Air Section 113(a) Administrative Orders In Relation To 
Electric Reliability And The Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (Dec. 16, 2011), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/mats-erp.pdf. 
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with FERC on reliability might lead to inter-agency friction,90 the 
implication was clear. 
Even where the agency has itself adopted no formal or informal 
limits on its ability to innovate procedurally, reputational concerns 
may counsel restraint. Daniel Carpenter has argued that agencies 
act with their reputations in mind with a goal of preserving a max-
imum of power and authority over the longer term. 91 And one of us 
has argued elsewhere that agencies sometimes exercise Bickelian 
“passive virtues”—restraint in the face of discretion—due to fear of 
reputational consequence.92 For example, if an agency believes that 
holding too many public meetings on a given topic (say climate 
change), would subject it to unwanted scrutiny by the political 
branches, it may limit such meetings even where it would be well 
within its authority to hold them. Strategic agencies will look be-
yond particular decisions to the best way to conserve authority and 
discretion in the longer term.93 
Finally, professional constraints limit agency procedural deci-
sions. One understanding of “discretion” is, as the Supreme Court 
has explained, “the absence of a hard and fast rule” that would  
deprive an agency of a choice of how to act.94 But “discretion" can 
also mean the exercise of sound judgment in decisionmaking.95  
Although discretion may be unconstrained by the law, courts, or 
other non-legal constraints, therefore, it is still constrained by good 
judgment.96 An individual agency’s professional culture and norms 
                                                                                                                   
90. See id. at 2 (noting only that it elected to consult with FERC “in light of the  
complexity of the electric system”). 
91. See DAN CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND  
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (arguing that the FDA's awareness of its 
reputation has shaped its operations over the years). 
92. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 
565 (2014). 
93. Id. at 569. 
94. 2 Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) (citing The Steamship Styria v. Morgan, 
186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902)). 
95. For adoption of this meaning in case law, see, e.g., Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 
541 (1931) (“When invoked as a guide to judicial action, it means a sound discretion, that is 
to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and 
equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of 
the judge to a just result.”); see also Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902) (quoting dictionary 
definitions of “discretion” to make the point that its exercise entails the application of reason 
and sound judgment). See also Discretion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2003), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discretion (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) 
(defining discretion as, among other things, “the quality of having or showing discernment or 
good judgment” and the “ability to make responsible decisions”). 
96. For this reason, even in areas in which agencies possess significant procedural  
discretion, successfully encouraging agencies to innovate requires giving those agencies com-
fort that innovation is lawful and within the scope of their discretion. See, e.g., Admin. Conf. 
of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 
48,789, 48,790 (“With respect to the issues addressed in this recommendation, the APA  
contains sufficient flexibility to support e-Rulemaking and does not need to be amended for 
these purposes at the present time. Although the primary goal of this recommendation is to 
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may also limit procedural experimentation beyond what is optional. 
Certain agencies have made headlines for their innovative cultures, 
but others can be conservative in their procedural choices.97 Even  
at relatively innovative agencies, fidelity to established modes of  




Agency procedural innovation is a regular feature of today's  
bureaucracy. And it takes place largely without judicial supervision. 
Even for those who fear too much agency autonomy, however, there 
is little cause for alarm. Notwithstanding the considerable white 
space left by Vermont Yankee and other legal constraints, agencies' 
discretion to adopt new procedures is still circumscribed. Because  
of the non-legal constraints identified in the previous section, we 
believe that we are unlikely to see procedural experimentation  
descending into arbitrariness. 
The interdependence of substance and procedure cuts in favor  
of recognizing broad agency procedural discretion. How an adminis-
trative system is designed will have a significant impact on whether, 
how, and in what way a substantive statutory mandate is fulfilled.99 
To restrict an agency's procedural discretion may often have the  
effect of restricting its substantive authority. This may be especially 
so in light of the resource constraints under which agencies must 
operate. Procedural design requires the exercise of expert judgment 
regarding how best to optimize available resources and prioritize 
competing statutory commands.100 Agencies are better situated 
than courts to make these judgments, in part because they have 
more complete, systemic information about the industry or subject 
they regulate and the way that various administrative approaches 
may work (or not) in that context.101 This comparative institutional 
advantage provides further justification for courts, Congress, and 
                                                                                                                   
dispel some of the legal uncertainty agencies face in e-Rulemaking, where the Conference 
finds that a practice is not only legally defensible, but also sound policy, it recommends that 
agencies use it.”). 
97. P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., 2014 BEST PLACES TO WORK IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
ANALYSIS 2 (2015) (performing an assessment of innovation at federal government agencies 
and concluding that six agencies had a “disproportionately high impact” on the overall inno-
vation score). In this survey, less than a third of federal employees who were looking for ways 
to be more innovative felt that creativity and innovation were rewarded. Id. 
98. See John. D. Dilulio, Jr., Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a 
Federal Government Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 277 (1994) (arguing 
for the relevance of agency culture in shaping bureaucratic action).  
99. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1921. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1922. 
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the executive to embrace a background norm of agency procedural 
discretion.102 
On the other hand, embracing agency procedural discretion may 
further contribute to the proliferation of a wide diversity of admin-
istrative procedures throughout the administrative state. While  
experimentation can lead to discovery of more effective, efficient 
governmental tools, it may also undermine uniformity and trans-
parency, making it harder for courts, Congress, and the public  
to understand how the administrative state as a whole operates. 
Although an agency may have superior information about its own 
activities and regulatory space, it lacks a broader systemic perspec-
tive across agencies. This downside to broad agency procedural  
discretion, however, can be addressed through means other than  
increased judicial enforcement of uniformity. Attention to cross-
agency procedural issues may help to break down the silo effect and 
enable agencies to consider broader systemic considerations as they 
design their own procedures. This may be accomplished through 
scholarly attention to systemic procedural issues, as well as through 
executive action to facilitate cross-pollination of procedural best 
practices across agencies.103 These activities can help to reduce  
unnecessary and harmful variation. They can also offer efficiencies 
by identifying procedures that have been successfully tested by one 
agency and can be used equally successfully by other agencies faced 
with similar issues. 
One major downside of the dearth of judicial oversight in this 
area, however, is that procedural innovation has received limited 
scholarly attention. We think that is a mistake. Research that offers 
a systemic, cross-agency perspective will enable the sharing of  
valuable procedural innovations across agencies. By identifying  
procedures that have been successfully tested by one agency, and 
can be used equally successfully by other agencies faced with similar 
issues, scholarship can help agencies capitalize on the promise of 
procedural innovation while promoting a degree of uniformity 
across agency practice that enables greater public understanding of 
and access to federal administration. 
                                                                                                                   
102. Judicial deference to agency decisionmaking is often justified on the basis of the 
“expertise-based comparative institutional advantage” of agencies. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 
& Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 517 (2011). 
103. The Administrative Conference of the United States is an institution well-designed 
and positioned to fulfill this role. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591–96 (2012). 
